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Abstract 
We analyze the effect of participation in short-term training measures on older Ger-
man recipients of means-tested unemployment benefits. Our analysis uses adminis-
trative data of the German Federal Employment Agency and we estimate the effects 
of participating in two types of short-term training - classroom and in-firm training - 
on different outcomes of the participants. Our results show that classroom training is 
not effective in making participants independent of benefit receipt. It has a moder-
ately positive effect on employment outcomes, which are highest for West German 
men. In contrast, in-firm training significantly raises the participants’ likelihood of 
finding regular jobs and of being independent of unemployment benefit receipt.* 
 
Key words: training measures, older workers, propensity score matching, welfare 
benefit recipients. 
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1. Introduction  
Although there has been a significant increase in the labor force participation of 
older workers in the last decade, early labor market exit and unemployment among 
older workers are still important issues in Germany (OECD, 2008). While the aver-
age unemployment rate for older workers in the OECD area is four percent, the un-
employment rate for individuals aged 55 to 64 in Germany is close to 12 percent 
(OECD, 2008). Moreover, the size of the older population relative to the size of the 
economically active population is rising. This implies major sustainability problems 
for the social security system. Thus, raising labor force participation of older workers 
is a major policy goal in Germany: first, by delaying the retirement age; and second, 
by designing adequate labor market policies that assist unemployed older workers in 
taking up jobs. 
Recent reforms in Germany have aimed at implementing and improving labor mar-
ket policies that bring people into work. These policies are not only concerned with 
dislocated unemployed workers. Unemployment or welfare benefit recipients, some 
of whom might have withdrawn from the labor market, have also become obliged to 
search for jobs and receive support from public employment service labor market 
policies. This mutual obligation regime aims at reducing their benefit dependency by 
taking up a job. There are both specific policies for older workers, such as wage 
subsidies for people aged at least 50 years, and policies for all unemployed people 
to which older unemployed workers are also entitled. 
A large number of studies have analyzed the impacts of different active labor market 
policies in Germany. Yet often little is known about their impact on unemployed 
people aged 50 years or older. This study analyzes the impact of short-term training 
measures on the labor market performance of older participants. This scheme is one 
of the most intensively used programs for older workers. Our analysis uses adminis-
trative data and estimates the program impact by propensity score matching. It not 
only looks at whether the program is effective for all older unemployed workers but 
whether it is particularly effective for specific groups of them, like people with or 
without professional qualification, people who have been jobless for many years or 
who live in regions with high versus low unemployment. We carry out the analysis 
for job-seekers who are not entitled to unemployment insurance (UI) benefit but to 
the means-tested unemployment benefit II (UB II). The time-limited and earnings-
related UI benefit is provided to workers who have recently lost their job and have 
contributed to unemployment insurance for a sufficient length of time. UB II, on the 
other hand, is a flat-rate welfare benefit with no time limits that is provided to people 
who are not eligible for UI and live in low-income households. This benefit was in-
troduced in January 2005 as part of a reform that aimed at activating means-tested 
benefit recipients by a mutual obligation regime. 
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2. Demographic and institutional context 
2.1 Demographic evolution in Germany and its fiscal implications 
In most OECD countries, life expectancy is rising rapidly while birth rates decline, 
causing fiscal sustainability problems. Germany is no exception. Its Federal Statisti-
cal Office (Statistisches Bundesamt) estimated that by 2050, 40 percent (ten per-
centage points more than at current) of the working-age population will be 50 to 64 
years old (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2006). By 2050, there will be about 55 people 
aged at least 65 years per 100 people of working age (20 to 64 years), i.e., twice as 
many as in 2005. Raising the retirement age to 67 years would only make a minimal 
difference, as we can see in Figure 1 where the number of people aged at least 65 
years (and 67 years) per 100 people aged 20 to 64 (and 20 to 66) is plotted. 
Without changes in income support schemes and labor force participation by older 
workers, population aging implies a major increase in public expenditure and other 
types of spending, e.g., on long-term care. Gruber & Wise (2001) analyzed current 
expenditure on the elderly by several OECD countries and projected a rise of such 
spending from 11.1 percent of GDP in 1995 to 15.1 percent in 2050 for Germany. 
Against this background, labor force participation of older workers is of great rele-
vance. 
2.2 The present situation of older workers in Germany 
Despite a significant increase in the labor force participation of older workers from 
40 percent to 58 percent since 1994 (OECD, 2008), early labor market exit and un-
employment rates for older workers are still important issues in Germany.1 Participa-
tion rates decline abruptly after the age of 60 years when the participation rates for 
men are close to 50 percent and those of women close to 30 percent, dropping at 
age 63 to 25 percent for men and to 10 percent for women (OECD 2005).2 For older 
people who remain active in the labor market, the incidence of unemployment and of 
long-term unemployment is high.3 The OECD (2005) has estimated that 11.7 per-
cent of the German working-age population are ‘mobilisable labor resources’; two-
thirds of this percentage is attributable to excess non-employment of older workers. 
Quite a few studies have investigated the factors which affect the employment of 
older workers, all showing that the institutional context is of high relevance. On the 
labor supply side, the generosity of unemployment compensation and pension sys-
tems influence participation and employment decisions (Schmidt 1995; Riphahn & 
                                                
1 These statistics refer to individuals aged 55 to 64. 
2 These statistics refer to the year 2003. As pointed out above participation rates of older workers have 
been improving since then. 
3 The standardized unemployment rate of older workers aged 55 to 64 years was about 12 percent in 
2005 and hence three times the level for all OECD countries (OECD 2008, p. 339 and 341). 
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Schmidt 1997; Eichhorst et al. 2004). On the labor demand side, companies have to 
deal with relatively non-transparent age-specific regulations (Pfarr et al. 2005; Brus-
sig et al. 2006; RWI/ISG 2005). Wage rigidity and increasing age-earnings profile 
have also been identified as a possible determinant of low employment rates of 
older workers in Germany. 
2.3 Passive and active labor market policies for older workers 
Most of the recent German labor market policy reforms were proposed by the “Hartz 
Commission” in 2002. There are three reform clusters proposed by this Commission 
(Kemmerling & Bruttel, 2005): 1) reforms that introduced New Public Management 
ideas for the Public Employment Service (PES) (Bundesagentur für Arbeit), 2) re-
forms of the unemployment benefit system, and 3) of active labor market policy. 
The unemployment benefit system has become less generous in recent years. Let 
us first turn to the unemployment insurance (UI) benefit, which amounts to 67 per-
cent of the last net wage for parents and 60 percent for childless people. Its duration 
depends on the contribution record prior to the benefit claim and age. In February 
2006 the maximum UI entitlement length was cut. Prior to the reform it was 18 to 26 
months for those aged 45 to 54 years and 26 to 36 months for those aged at least 
55 years. After the reform it was only 12 months for the former and 18 months for 
the latter. At the start of 2008 entitlement lengths were again raised to 15 months for 
50 to 54 year olds and to 24 months for those over 57, but they are still much 
shorter than prior to the reforms. 
Before 2005, unemployed people who exhausted UI or were not eligible for UI could 
receive means-tested unemployment assistance (UA) benefit. Its level depended on 
former earnings with replacement rates of 57 percent for parents and 53 percent for 
childless people. For people with no contribution period there was means-tested 
social assistance, a flat rate benefit. In 2005 both benefits were merged to the new 
means-tested “Unemployment Benefit II” (UB II) under the law on basic income sup-
port for job-seekers (Social Code II). This new welfare benefit is virtually independ-
ent of former earnings and usually lower than UA.4 Statistics of the Federal Em-
ployment Agency show that about 50 percent of the 1.2 million unemployed people 
aged at least 50 years received UB II. In 2008 the corresponding numbers were 60 
percent and 900,000; thus the share of UB II recipients rose. 
A related reform in December 2007 abolished the “58er-Regelung” (Article 428 So-
cial Code III), an incentive for early labor market exit: Benefit recipients aged at least 
58 years could indicate to the PES that they would retire as early as possible. In 
                                                
4 The OECD computed changes in net earnings replacement rates from 2001 to 2005 for unemployed 
people in different countries in the 60th month of benefit receipt (OECD 2007: p. 172). Germany is 
one of the countries with quite high reductions of net replacement rates. They were particularly high 
for two-earner married couples: With 67% of the average wage, the reduction is about 10 to 11 per-
centage points; with 150% of the average wage the corresponding numbers are 26 to 27 percentage 
points. 
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turn, they were neither registered as unemployed, nor available for suitable jobs nor 
subject to benefit sanctions. 
As to active labor market policies, since the reform a large number of programs 
have been available to improve the employability of older workers and to integrate 
unemployed people into the labor market. These include temporary wage subsidies 
paid to regular employers or to unemployed people who take up a job, traditional 
public works, different training programs, assignment to private placement services 
as well as subsidies for start-ups. Some of these schemes are specifically designed 
for older unemployed workers.5 The number of participants in these programs varies 
considerably. In terms of program inflow, short-term training and work opportunities 
are of major importance. 
Work opportunities (Article 16d Social Code II) were introduced in 2005. They de-
serve attention as an example of a policy that was designed to raise employability, 
but which very quickly became an alternative to unemployment prior to retirement 
for older workers. Only UB II recipients are eligible for work opportunities (Arbeitsge-
legenheiten mit Mehraufwandsentschädigung). They aim to target people who are 
very hard to place. Participants receive on top of their benefits one to two Euros per 
hour worked to cover additional costs of working, e.g., for traveling to work and 
higher expenses for meals.6 Work opportunities may not compete with regular jobs 
and must be in the public interest. Hence they are supposed to be mainly jobs in 
non-profit organizations. Younger people participate for no longer than a year and 
usually six months or less (Hohmeyer et al., 2006). However, UB II recipients aged 
at least 58 years were allowed between July 2005 and December 2006 to partici-
pate in work opportunities that lasted up to three years (Bundesministerium für Ar-
beit und Soziales, 2005). It offered older workers an alternative to unemployment 
and was at the same time a pre-retirement step. 
Of the active labor market measures introduced with the reform, some were de-
signed to increase the reemployment chances of older workers. Others, though, like 
work opportunities and public works, offer an alternative to unemployment before 
retirement. Our main interest is in short-term training, which we discuss in detail in 
the next section. 
                                                
5 For details of policies for older workers see Eichhorst & Sproß (2005). 
6 There are also work opportunities with a regular wage. In terms of number of participants they are of 
minor importance. 
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3. Description of the short-term training program 
In this study we look at the impact of participation in short-term training (Articles 48 
to 52 Social Code III) that aims at integrating unemployed people into jobs.7 In terms 
of inflow, short training measures and work opportunities are among the most impor-
tant schemes for older UB II recipients. According to information from the Statistics 
Department of the Federal Employment Agency in 2005, there were over 30,000 
training participants in the age-group 50 to 57 years and 1,400 were aged 58 to 64 
years.8 The corresponding numbers for work opportunities are 100,000 and 15,000. 
Short-term training participation can help to improve specific knowledge (e.g., lan-
guage and software courses). It can also raise job search effectiveness with courses 
on writing applications and on job interviews (Jozwiak & Wolff, 2007). Finally, train-
ing measures are a scheme to test willingness to work and the flexibility of the un-
employed persons. Training is usually carried out in a group but there are also indi-
vidual program in the form of internships in a firm. 
Training participation can last from a few days to up to eight weeks. Participants are 
entitled to their unemployment benefit and costs related to the training are covered. 
It is unlikely that participants reduce their job search efforts which would negatively 
affect their re-employment chances both during and shortly after the potential par-
ticipation period, so, we expect no lock-in effects, i.e., a reduction of job search ef-
fort while participating in the programs.9 
There are some studies which estimate treatment effects of short-term training on 
participants in Germany mainly using administrative micro data. They focus on par-
ticipants and comparable unemployed people for different periods between the 
years 2000 and 2005 and mainly estimate effects on employment or unemployment 
outcomes either by the multivariate duration framework10 of Abbring and van den 
                                                
7 A reform in 2009 (Gesetz zur Neuausrichtung der arbeitsmarktpolitischen Instrumente) raised the 
degree of flexibility of case-workers of the PES by specifying policy goals rather than policy contents 
in the Social Code III. Some policies like short-term training are no longer regulated in detail, but can 
still be implemented. 
8 The data excludes 69 districts, in which local authorities do not cooperate with the Federal Employ-
ment Agency when administering unemployment benefit II. No systematic information on active la-
bor market program participation in these districts is available for the first years after introducing the 
new benefit. 
9 Lock-in effects are more of an issue when program participation is long and is associated with an 
income  that is considerably higher than the unemployment benefit. A standard example are subsi-
dized job creation schemes/public works for unemployed workers, where they work full-time in a 
subsidized job of public interest and receive a regular wage. Then they are left with less time and 
lower incentives to search for a job than while they are unemployed. 
10 This framework takes into account that program participation is not random but depends on observ-
able and unobservable factors, which both might affect an outcome of interest. It jointly models by 
means of a mixed proportional hazards model an individual’s time since the start of unemployment 
until program participation and the time since start of unemployment until exit into some state of in-
terest (outcome equation), e.g., into a job, conditional on observable covariates and error terms that 
are allowed to be correlated over the two processes. The effect of program participation on the exit 
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Berg (2003) or by propensity score matching to which we turn in section 4.2. The 
former applies to Hujer et al. (2006) and the latter to Stephan et al. (2006), Biewen 
et al. (2007) and Jozwiak & Wolff (2007). 
Most of these studies find a moderate improvement in the labor market performance 
of participants as a result of short-term training. When distinguishing between class-
room and in-firm training, the results sometimes point to high treatment effects for 
the latter as opposed to the former program. Jozwiak & Wolff (2007), for example, 
find for participants who received UB II that in-firm training raised their chances of 
working in regular jobs by about 13 to 20 percentage points 20 months after the start 
of the training program; for classroom training this impact is only one to three per-
centage points. 
The above mentioned studies mainly exclude older age-groups, like Hujer et al. 
(2006) who excluded those aged above 55 years or Biewen et al. (2007) who ex-
cluded those aged above 53 years from their analysis. In contrast to them, we ana-
lyse treatment effects of short-term training for specific groups of older workers. 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1 Data description 
Our analysis uses several administrative micro data sets from the German Federal 
Employment Agency. The “Integrated Employment Biographies” (IEB) contain spells 
of employment, unemployment, unemployment benefit receipt and active labor mar-
ket program participation, where duration is measured in days. Next, we use a job-
seeker data base and information from the unemployment benefit II histories. The 
latter contains spells of unemployment benefit II receipt together with a household 
identifier. With this unique number for each household of welfare recipients, we can 
identify the partner of a sample member and can control for partner information. 
Employment information in the IEB is available with a considerable time lag. There-
fore we use the more recent employment information of an additional data base 
(Verbleibsnachweise) of the Statistics Department of the Federal Employment 
Agency. 
We selected a sample that contains all unemployed people who receive UB II and 
are aged 50 to 62 years at the end of August 2005. All sample members who started 
a short-term training participation from September to November 2005 are our treat-
ment group. All other sample members are the potential control group. From the 
latter we draw adequate comparison persons for the treated. To estimate effects of 
training participation, we need to compare the participants’ outcomes in different 
                                                                                                                                        
rate from unemployment into a job is captured by the parameter of a time-varying dummy variable 
that is zero before participation and one after program participation started in the outcome equation. 
In contrast to matching estimators the mixed proportional hazards model takes unobservable factors 
into account but relies on functional form assumptions of an outcome equation. 
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months after training started with the corresponding outcomes of comparison per-
sons in the same months after training start. As the latter group did not, however, 
start any short-term training during the months September to November 2005, these 
same months after training start are not defined. Therefore, we randomly chose a 
training start month for them. It is a random draw from the distribution of the three 
training start months of the participant group. We excluded control persons from our 
data, who between the end of August 2005 and first day of the program start month, 
found regular jobs, were not unemployed or did not receive the UB II, so that the 
remaining control persons could still potentially enter short-term training in the po-
tential program start month. 
Table 1 displays our sample sizes. For classroom training, we distinguish between 
men and women in East and West Germany. For these four groups the number of 
treated persons ranges from about 1,400 to 1,900 cases; these sample sizes are 
large enough to estimate treatment effects for additional subgroups: Germans only, 
people with and without professional skills, singles vs. couples, people who lost their 
last regular job within the last 44 months and people who lost it earlier. Finally, we 
distinguish between high and low unemployment districts, where the threshold un-
employment rate is 21 percent for East and 13 percent for West Germany. From our 
results on classroom training we can conclude whether treatment is more effective 
for specific groups of people. This could have important policy implications: One 
implication would be to direct the programs more frequently to those groups of older 
workers whose success in the labor market improves due to participating in one of 
the training programs. The opposite would hold for those groups of older worker 
where we find the policy to be ineffective. 
In the case of in-firm training, our data contains only about 400 cases for East and 
roughly 600 for West Germany so we estimate treatment effects for this type of 
training separately only for these two regions. 
4.2 Methodology 
In our first step, we analyze which characteristics of the older workers drive partici-
pation in the program by estimating probit models of the probability of entering a 
short-term training program between September and November of the year 2005. 
In the second step, we estimate treatment effects of short-term training participation 
on employment and benefit related outcomes by a matching approach. The basic 
idea is to find a group of non-participants who are similar to the participants in all 
relevant pre-program characteristics and then calculate the difference between their 
outcomes (Hujer & Caliendo 2000). This approach controls for selection on observ-
ables, X. Thus differences between the outcomes of the treated and the matched 
controls are not due to differences in observed characteristics that affect outcomes. 
We are interested in the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), i.e., the av-
erage effect of program participation on an outcome of the participants, as shown in 
equation one: 
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]1)0([]1)1([)1( =−==== DYEDYEDEATT ττ     (1) 
Y(1) represents the outcome with treatment and Y(0) without treatment. D=1 and 
D=0 indicates whether a person belongs to the treatment or the control group. The 
ATT is the difference between the expected outcome of the treated given that they 
are treated (E[Y(1)|D=1]) and the expected outcome of the treated if they had not 
been treated (E[Y(0)|D=1]). Since the latter is unobservable, the effect can only be 
estimated if a suitable control group is considered. If this is the case, 
]0)0([ =DYE  is a consistent estimator of ]1)0([ =DYE . With exact matching 
for each treated person, one or more controls are selected from a potential control 
group that is such that they do not differ with respect to pre-treatment observables 
X. If the vector X is of high dimension it is hardly possible to implement exact match-
ing. Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983, 1984, and 1985) propose an alternative matching 
mechanism based on a propensity score p(X). A propensity score is a one-
dimensional function of the pre-treatment covariates. We use propensity score 
matching and our propensity score is the predicted probability of participating in 
short-term training based on our probit analysis of the determinants of participation. 
An important assumption in the propensity score matching approach is the Condi-
tional Independence Assumption (CIA). According to the CIA, outcomes in case of 
treatment or non-treatment are independent of the assignment to treatment given 
the propensity score. We need only the weak version of this assumption on the out-
come without treatment: 
)()0( XpDY ⊥
          
 (2) 
For the CIA to hold, it is important to control in the participation equation for the rele-
vant factors that determine both participation and outcomes. We control for socio-
demographic characteristics, district level indicators on the situation of the labor 
market, detailed information on past periods of employment, unemployment and 
active labor market program participation. In particular detailed past labor market 
outcomes should make it likely that the CIA holds. 
Under the CIA, the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) or net effect of 
training participation on the outcome Y of training participants in our context can be 
defined as: 
}1)](,0)0([)](,1)1([{
)]}(,1)0()1([{
==−==
=−=
DXpDYEXpDYEE
XpDYYEEATTτ
   (3) 
As short-term training is intended to bring participants into jobs and thus reduce their 
benefit dependency, we consider two outcomes: (1) unsubsidized contributory 
(regular) employment, and (2) receiving no UB II. We regard them as binary out-
comes at different points in time after the start of the program. Hence, we estimate 
an impact on the share of treated who are in regular jobs or who receive no UB II. 
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Moreover, we estimate impacts on the number of months in each of the two states 
during a given time window after the start of the training program. We apply nearest 
neighbor matching with five neighbors and replacement. I.e., for each treated person 
five control persons are chosen by propensity score matching and specific control 
persons can be matched to various treated persons. 
4.3 Participation structure 
In order to analyze determinants of participation and to implement the propensity 
score matching approach, we estimate probit models of short-term training participa-
tion and predict the propensity score for each of the groups mentioned in section 
4.1. 
From the probit analysis it can be concluded that individuals in the younger age 
group (aged 50 to 57) are more likely to participate in both in-firm and classroom 
training. As already discussed in a previous section, this is due to the labor market 
exit possibilities of the older individuals (aged 58 until 64). We also observe that 
higher education has a positive effect on the in-firm training participation probability, 
especially for West Germans. The higher the level of education, the higher is the 
participation probability. Past training program participation is another important de-
terminant: people who already participated in a training program in the last five 
years are more likely to participate in classroom training. Unemployment history and 
a partner’s unemployment history also drive in-firm training participation. While own 
past long term unemployment experience negatively affects the probability of in-firm 
training participation, past long term unemployment experience of the partner in-
creases the probability of participation. Finally, regional factors (especially unem-
ployment rates and the proportion of long-term unemployed) are very important de-
terminants of training participation.11 
4.4 Estimated effects of participating in short-term training on the 
participants’ performance 
Figures 2 and 3 show the estimated classroom training treatment effects on the 
share of participants in regular employment and on the share of participants without 
any receipt of UB II.12 The effects are plotted against time since program start. The 
employment effects (Figure 2) tend to be positive. For men in East Germany and 
                                                
11 We do not display the probit results here for spatial reasons; they are available on request. 
12 We have carried out various analyses to check the quality of our propensity score matching proce-
dure for each of the samples that we analyzed. The results imply a high match quality in terms of 
nearly no differences in observed characteristics between treated and matched controls. A summary 
statistic on this latter issue, the mean standardized absolute bias, reaches, with few exceptions, lev-
els below two percent. There is no critical value for this statistic. However, Caliendo and Kopeinig 
(2008) mention that in most matching studies a value below three to five percent is regarded as 
successful. The results on match quality are available on request. 
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women after about three months, they are usually at around one percentage point. 
Yet they are mostly insignificant at a five percent level with the exception of the ef-
fects in the first three to eight months for East German women. For West German 
men they are somewhat higher, well determined and reach a level of more than two 
percentage points 12 months after the start of training. The positive effect of class-
room training participation for West German men might reflect their general better 
opportunities in the labor market. Both the total unemployment rate and the one for 
older workers in West Germany are far lower than in East Germany. In comparison 
to West German women, men have on average a higher level of education, and a 
better employment history. In West Germany training participation might help to im-
prove employment opportunities for men, who are the ones who have better 
chances in the labor market. For the other groups, however, even if training im-
proves their skills, their employment opportunities are so restricted that no positive 
effect is found. 
Table 2 shows that 21 months after program start, the employment rate of the 
matched controls, i.e., without treatment, is between 3.8 percent (East German 
women) and 7.8 percent (West German men). Hence, a treatment effect of about 
one to two percentage points might be low at first sight. But it implies a considerable 
increase in the employment rate. Figure 3, though, demonstrates that the effects of 
classroom training on avoiding UB II receipt are usually close to zero and insignifi-
cant. For East German males they are even negative and partly well-determined. 
The treatment effects for in-firm training as displayed in Figures 4 and 5 for East and 
West Germans are clearly much higher than the classroom training effects. Already 
in the first two to three months after entering the program, there is a high impact of 
more than 10 and later even more than 16 percentage points on the employment 
rate of in-firm training participants (Figure 4). The estimated effect on the rate of no 
UB II receipt (Figure 5) is similar to the employment effects for West Germans and 
usually somewhat lower than the employment effects for East Germans. As East 
German wages are lower than those in West Germany, employment take-up less 
often implies that a person’s household is no longer in need of welfare benefit sup-
port. 
Table 3 displays the estimated employment effects of classroom training for several 
subgroups, as described in Section 4.1. It displays both an effect on the employment 
rate (as in Figures 2 and 4) and the effect on the number of months in regular em-
ployment during the first 21 months after program commencement. Similar to the 
results shown in Figure 2, we of course observe that for West German males in par-
ticular, there are considerable and well-determined effects of classroom training. 
There is little variation of the effect over the different subgroups of West German 
men: The impact ranges from 2.8 percentage points (treated with no professional 
training or with their last job ending more than 44 months ago) to 4.4 percentage 
points (treated with partner/couple). The estimated effect on the number of months 
of regular employment ranges from 0.2 to 0.5 months. 
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For East German men and women the estimated effects on the employment rate of 
the subgroups are nearly always statistically insignificant. We find some well-
determined impacts on the number of months employed during the first 21 months 
after entering the program. For the entire sample of East German men and East 
German women as well as for East Germans with any professional qualification and 
East Germans living in a district with a low unemployment rate we find that due to 
their training participation they are employed for an additional 0.2 to 0.3 months in 
unsubsidized jobs during a 21 month period after the start of the training. For West 
German women we find well-determined positive impacts ranging from 0.2 to 0.4 
months of additional employment for participants of German nationality, single par-
ticipants whose job ended within the last 44 months and participants in high unem-
ployment regions. We also estimated the impacts on the outcome no UB II receipt 
for the subgroups, where we find significant impacts that are usually negative in only 
a few cases.13 
There may be many potential reasons for the result that classroom training has posi-
tive impacts on the regular employment rate of participants but usually does not re-
duce their rate of benefit dependency. One reason is that the earnings of classroom 
training participants in accepted jobs are in some cases not sufficiently high to end 
the welfare benefit receipt of their household. An additional explanation is that with-
out training, some older welfare benefit recipients would have become discouraged. 
As a consequence, they would have more often considered other routes out of wel-
fare receipt like early retirement and the related pension income or moving to a 
household of relatives with sufficient means of income. 
5. Summary and conclusions 
The unemployment rate of older workers in Germany is considerably higher than the 
average unemployment rate of older workers in the OECD (OECD 2008). Further-
more, early labor market exit is still an important issue in the German labor market. 
Taking into account that the work force is aging dramatically, raising their participa-
tion rates has become an important goal of German labor market policy. In this way, 
Germany follows the agreed goal at the European level to keep an increasing num-
ber of older workers in gainful employment as long as possible (Europäische Kom-
mission 2003). Since 2002, passive and active labor market measures have been 
introduced in order to activate the ‘mobilisable labor resources’ among which non-
employed older workers play an important role. 
In this paper we estimated the effect of short-term training measures on the labor 
market performance of unemployed welfare recipients aged 50 to 62 years who par-
ticipated in such programs. The analysis contributes to the debate on which meas-
ures help to improve the re-employment chances of older workers. We distinguished 
between short-term classroom and in-firm training. We estimated their impact using 
                                                
13 These latter results are available on request. 
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administrative data and applying methods of propensity score matching. Our study 
regarded impacts for more than 20 months after the participants’ short-term training 
started. 
For classroom training this analysis has been carried out separately for many differ-
ent subgroups. When we look at the broad groups of men and women in East and 
West Germany, the estimated positive impact of classroom training on employment 
outcomes is only significant for West German men. Moreover, there are either insig-
nificant or in the case of East German men, slightly negative impacts of classroom 
training participation on avoiding welfare benefit receipt. In contrast to classroom 
training, in-firm training affected all outcomes of the participants positively and the 
effects are far higher than for classroom training participants. Our results imply, 
therefore, that the short-term training program is to some degree an effective policy 
for integrating older unemployed workers in low-income households into regular 
jobs. 
For East Germans the results on classroom training may be the consequence of a 
generally depressed labor market. The (registered) unemployment rate in East 
Germany ranged from 15 to about 19 percent in our observation period from 2005 to 
2007 (Federal Employment Agency, 2009). It was about twice as high as the West 
German one. Due to high competition for vacancies in East Germany, a labor sup-
ply-side policy like short-term classroom training may be insufficient to improve the 
employment perspectives of participants. 
The fact that in-firm training has particularly high beneficial impacts on participants 
in both regions is then no surprise, as such internships imply a direct contact to a 
firm, where the participants may continue working. The labor demand side profits by 
a probation period without wage cost, while participants on the supply side receive 
some training on-the-job. Our results on in-firm training point towards putting more 
effort in developing policies which support demand for older workers and bring un-
employed older workers into a contact with potential employers. 
In our analysis, we do not find much evidence that classroom training affects spe-
cific subgroups of older welfare benefit recipients more strongly than others. Thus, 
there is no strong evidence in favor of targeting specific groups of older workers. 
There is some evidence for a higher impact of classroom training for participants 
with a professional qualification in contrast to participants without such a qualifica-
tion. Presumably, classroom training helps older workers with formal education to 
update their skills, and in turn to more easily find a job. 
There are several limitations to our study. Firstly, the administrative data is not in-
formative on some issues. We cannot observe some reasons for ending welfare 
benefit receipt, like starting the receipt of an early retirement pension or moving into 
a high-income household. Thus, we cannot make statements about the importance 
of such issues for our results. Moreover, there might be insufficient information on 
characteristics that determine success in the labor market and the probability of en-
tering a training scheme. In turn the matching approach could fail to find comparable 
non-participants for the training participants; e.g., for in-firm training one might ex-
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pect that firms frequently take on trainees with specific, hardly observable talents 
that enhance their success in the firm. If such talents have little relation to observ-
able characteristics in our data, our estimated employment effects of in-firm training 
are likely to be upward biased. Secondly, firms might hire the same type of unem-
ployed workers that they would have hired anyway, but take advantage of the in-firm 
training program as a prolonged probation period without wage cost. Then the esti-
mated impact of in-firm training would be rather spurious. Thirdly, our results allow 
no statements about general equilibrium and macroeconomic effects. 
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Figure 1: Ratio of individuals aged at least 65 years (and 67 years) per 100 
individuals aged 20 to 64 (and 20 to 66). 
 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 
Figure 2:  Net effect of classroom training on the regular employment rate of 
participants1)  
-2
0
2
4
6
-2
0
2
4
6
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 0 4 8 12 16 20 24
ef
fe
ct
 in
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
ts
ef
fe
ct
 in
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
ts
ef
fe
ct
 in
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
ts
ef
fe
ct
 in
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
ts
Men - East Germany Women - East Germany
Men - West Germany Women - West Germany
months after program start
 
1) Treatment effects are displayed together with 95 % confidence bands, based on analytical standard 
errors. 
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Figure 3: Net effect of classroom training on the rate of no UB II receipt of 
participants1)  
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1) Treatment effects are displayed together with 95 % confidence bands, based on analytical 
standard errors. 
 
 
Figure 4: Net effect of in-firm training on the regular employment rate of 
participants1)  
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1) Treatment effects are displayed together with 95 % confidence bands, based on analytical standard 
errors. 
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Figure 5: Net effect of in-firm training on the rate of no UB II of participants1)  
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1) Treatment effects are displayed together with 95 % confidence bands, based on analytical standard 
errors. 
Table 1:  Sample sizes 
Treated Potential Treated Potential Treated Potential Treated Potential
Controls Controls Controls Controls
Classroom Training
Total sample 1.403 62.544 1.385 55.174 1.930 113.151 1.430 88.186
German nationality 1.327 58.648 1.332 51.444 1.578 89.342 1.213 65.806
Professional qualification
none 263 15.231 338 16.694 878 57.102 796 58.182
any 1.140 47.313 1.047 38.480 1.052 56.049 634 30.004
Family status
single 737 31.866 641 25.909 1.080 63.302 888 49.566
couple 666 30.678 744 29.265 850 49.849 542 38.620
Time since last regular job
44 months or less 499 19.864 324 13.058 794 40.417 525 24.634
more than 44 months 903 42.607 1.061 42.079 1.133 72.652 905 63.505
Unemployment rate1)
low 549 26.475 522 24.674 1.097 53.692 814 42.706
high 854 36.069 863 30.500 833 59.459 616 45.480
In-Firm Training
Treated Potential Treated Potential
Controls Controls
Total sample 507 117.718 596 201.337
East Germany West Germany
East Germany West Germany
Men Women Men Women
1) District unemployment rate in August 2005; low East G. <21%, low West G. < 13%, high East G. 
>=21%, high West G. >=13% 
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Table 2: Outcomes for matched treated, matched controls and all controls 
at the end of the observation window1) 
Women
Share Number of Share Number of Share Number of Share Number of
in of in of in of in of
percent months2) percent months2) percent months2) percent months2)
Classroom Training
Regular employment 
matched treated 7.5 0.9 4.8 0.7 11.0 1.3 7.0 0.9
matched controls 6.2 0.7 3.8 0.5 7.8 0.9 6.3 0.7
No receipt of UB II
matched treated 16.0 2.0 16.0 2.0 24.0 3.2 18.0 2.5
matched controls 19.0 2.4 15.0 2.0 23.0 3.3 20.0 2.7
In-Firm Training
Regular employment 
matched treated 27.0 4.2 26.0 4.5
matched controls 10.0 1.1 9.7 1.2
No receipt of UB II
matched treated 36.0 5.7 43.0 7.8
matched controls 21.0 2.9 27.0 3.8
West GermanyEast Germany
Men Men Women
East Germany West Germany
1) 21 months after start of program for regular employment and 26 months after start of program for no 
UB II.  
2) Average of the total number of months that sample members were in regular employment during 21 
months after program start or received no UB II at all during 26 months after program start. 
Table 3: Net effect on regular employment rate and months of regular 
employment 21 months after start of program 
in percentage in percentage in percentage in percentage
Month after programme start
Classroom Training
Total sample 1.3 0.2 * 1.0 0.2 ** 3.3 *** 0.4 *** 0.7 0.2
German nationality 1.5 0.2 * 0.5 0.2 * 3.0 *** 0.3 *** 1.2 0.2 *
Professional qualification
none -2.1 * -0.1 -0.6 0.0 3.0 ** 0.2 * 0.1 0.1
any 2.3 * 0.3 ** 1.4 0.3 ** 2.8 ** 0.5 *** 2.1 0.3
Family status
single 1.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 2.9 ** 0.4 *** 1.4 0.3 *
couple 1.0 0.1 1.2 0.2 * 4.4 *** 0.5 ** 0.5 0.1
Time since last regular job
44 months or less 0.4 0.2 2.9 0.4 4.0 ** 0.5 ** 3.1 0.4 *
more than 44 months 1.1 0.1 0.6 0.2 ** 2.8 *** 0.3 *** -0.1 0.1
Unemployment rate1)
low 2.4 0.2 0.8 0.1 3.0 ** 0.3 ** 1.3 0.1
high 0.9 0.2 * 0.9 0.3 ** 3.5 ** 0.5 *** 1.1 0.3 *
In-Firm Training
Total sample 17.0 *** 3.1 *** 16.0 *** 3.3 ***
East Germany West Germany
points
Effect on
Empl. rate months
employed
points
Effect on
Empl. rate
points
Effect on
Empl. rate months
employed
points
Effect on
Empl. rate months
employed
months
employed
West GermanyEast Germany
Men Women Men Women
1) District unemployment rate in August 2005; low East G. <21%, low West G. < 13%, high East G. 
>=21%, high West G. >=13% 
Results from nearest neighbour matching with five neighbours and replacement. 
Significance levels: *** for 1 percent, ** for 5 percent, 
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